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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ELMER HUBER and
ROY HUBER,
Plaintiffs and .Respondents,
-vs.DEEP CREEK IRRIGATION
COMPANY, a corporation,
OLLIE W. JUSTICE, ORLAND
COOK, DARVALL COOK and
BEN COOK,
Defendants and Appellants,

· Civil
No. 8432

MOSBY IRRIGATION
COMPANY,
Intervenor.

Respondents' Brief
NATURE OF CASE
Appellants' Statement of Facts is adequate to present the nature of the controversy, but is not acceptable to
Respondents as a Statement of Facts. Appellants are
confronted with the burden of showing that the evidence
1
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will not sustain the trial court's findings. Appellants
have ignored the evidence which sustains the trial court
and have presented only the conflicting evidence. We will
endeavor in the presentation of the argument to detail
the evidence which supports the trial court's findings.
We consider it sufficient to here state that Respondents' predecessors were the first actual users of water
as among these parties, and had a well-developed farm
before any of Appellants came to that area. Respondents
hold a certificate of appropriation from the Office of the
State Engineer. That certificate on its face carries a priority seniority to the claimed rights of any of the Appellants. The certificate was issued the 12th day of July,
1926. Appellants admit on cross-examination that in the
early 1930's a meeting was held to reach an understanding on the use of water in Deep Creek. There is some evidence that this understanding may have been reduced
to writing, but no one produced a copy of it (R. 107).
A.ll of the parties who testified concerning this agreement
stated that the parties at that time agreed the Hubers
(Respondents) and their predecessors, who were farthest
downstream, had a right to the water until the water
would not reach them in quantities sufficient to do them
any good. When the waters ceased to reach the Hubers,
then the upstream people could take it (R. 60, 115, 174,
175, 108, 243). From the early 1930's until immediately
prior to the suit the evidence is that the water was so used.
Thus Respondents were admittedly the first users; they
have a certificate of appropriation which gives them the
senior right to the use of this water; and their right has
2
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been recognized and honored by the Appellants for nearly
thirty years. At least two of Appellants or their predecessors admitted on cross-examination that they had
always considered that the Hubers had the prior or senior
right (R. 117, 174, 175).
Appellants are attempting to effect a forfeiture by
going behind the certificate of appropriation, and have
the court declare that it was erroneously issued and to
permit them to obtain a priority contrary to their paper
rights and contrary to their usage during the past quarter century.
ARGUMENT
1.

THE CERTIFICATE OF APPROPRIATION NOW OWNED BY RESPONDENTS
IS VALID AND CORRECTLY REFLECTS
THEIR WATER RIGHT.

The Appellants challenge the trial court's conclusion
that Respondents' Certificate of Appropriation grants to
Respondents the senior right to the use of the waters of
Deep Creek. They place their argument entirely upon
the fact that the Judge drew an erroneous conclusion of
law, to-wit, that the certificate can not be collaterally
attacked. The problem really has two facets. The first
involves the question of whether the record in the trial
court discloses substantial compliance with the statutes
so that the certificate was properly issued. An examination of this matter would assume arguendo that the trial
court should have examined the problem of the proper
3
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issuance of the certificate. The court received, pro forma,
all of the evidence, but turned its decision upon the conclusion that certificates of appropriation, like patents to
land, are not subject to collateral attack. This holding
made it unnecessary for the court to go into the facts
relating to the issuance of the certificate. We believe that
this ruling was correct, but we also contend that even if
we go behind the certificate, the facts show substantial
compliance with the statutes.
(a) THE COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT
THE CERTIFICAE COULD NOT BE COLLATERALLY ATTACKED.
There is no allegation or charge on the part of Appellants that there was fraud in the issuance of the certificate, or that there is any other ground for directly
attacking it. Appellants simply ask the trial court in a
collateral proceeding to examine everything that happened in the Office of the State Engineer from the date
the application was filed in 1908 until the certificate of
appropnation issued in 1926. There is one Utah case in
which the Supreme Court states that certificates of
appropriation on water are similar to patents to land,
and that irregularities in the proceedings prior to the
issuance of the patent or the certificate are cured by the
iH~uance of the certificate. In the case of fraud or jurisdictional error timely suits may be brought to set aside
a patent thus improperly issued, but there is no authority which will sustain the proposition that a patent or a
certificah' can be collaterally attacked nearly thirty years
4
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We submit that the case of Warren Irrigation Co. vs.
Charlton, et al, 58 Utah 113, 197 P. 1030, is in point, and
that the trial court correctly applied it when it drew
the conclusion that Appellants had not made a showing
which would justify the trial court in impeaching the certificate of appropriation owned by Respondents.
In that case the Supreme Court said:
"In our opinion, the question presented here
should be determined by the same rules and principles which control in cases involving the effect
given to patents issued for public land by the Land
Department of the United States. [The court cites
Moore v. Robbins, 96 U.S. 530, 24 L. Ed. 848, and
Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 636, 26 L. Ed. 875,
and quotes with approval from each, and then
says:]
"At page 641 of 104 U. S. (26 L. Ed. 875), in
speaking of the conclusiveness of a land patent as
evidence, the court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Field, says :
'It is this unassailable character which gives
to it its chief, indeed its only, value, as a
means of quieting its possessor in the enjoyment of the lands it embraces. If intruders
upon them could compel him, in every suit for
possession, to establish the validity of the
action of the Land Department and the correctness_ of its ruling upon matters submitted
to it, the patent, instead of being a means of
peace and security, would subject his rights
to constant and ruinous litigation.'

5
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"See, also other cases cited by respondent: Welsh
v. Callvert, et al, Land Commissioners, 34 Wash.
250, 75 Pac. 871; Plummer v. Brown, 70 Cal. 544,
12 Pac. 464; Steel v. Smelting Co., 106 U. S. 447,
1 Sup. Ct. 389,27 L. Ed. 226.
''As we understand the law applicable to this
question, we are forced to the conclusion that the
trial court committed no error in rejecting the evidence offered to contradict the recitals contained
in the certificate of appropriation.''
"\Vater law and mining law had common origins.
Principles of law which have developed to govern one
have been interchangeably cited to govern the other. In
the case of the filing of mining claims, the cases are numerous and unanimous in holding that all the irregularities which transpire after the original filing of the mining
claim and through the issuance of patent, are cured by
the issuance of patent. These are the cases cited by the
Utah Supreme Court as noted above. See also United
States v. Miner, 114 United States 233, 29 L. Ed. 110.
There is no reason why this same rule should not
apply to certificates of appropriation in water matters.
The State Engineer is charged by statute with administering the procedure for perfecting a water right. He is
not merely a file clerk to rereiYe documents and hold them
for later court review. He must at the outset prepare the
forms to be used. He must examine an application and
determine whether or not it is sufficiently detailed to meet
the requirements of the statute. If he examines an application and concludes that it is adequate, it is filed and the
applicant relies on that decision when he goes forward
6
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with his appropriation. It would be a serious thing to
permit a court thirty years later to re-examine the application to appropriate, and to then rule that the State
Engineer in the exercise of his statutory function in this
regard erred in permitting the application to be filed.

r~ilie

Each step taken by applicant has a similar problem
in it. For exmnple, the statutes provide that an application for an extension of time must be made in affidavit
form. A particular applicant may apply for an extension
and the showing he makes may not be properly notarized
or may have other technical deficiencies which do not literally conform to the statRte. Nevertheless, the State
Engineer accepts the affidavit, acts thereon and grants
an extension of time. The applicant would reply upon the
decision and proceed with the expenditure of money to
complete his work and obtain his certificate. Again, it
would seriously place a cloud of uncertainty on all water
rights in the State if this court were to hold that thirty
years later another water user could ask the court to go
behind the certificate of appropriation to review the
question of whether the affidavit for the extension was
adequate. The liberality of the courts in this regard is
well demonstrated by two cases relating to extensions of
time for submitting proof. See Pool v. Utah County, 59
Utah 242, 202 P. 1096, and Re Application 7600, 63 Utah
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311, 225 P. 605.
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Appellants here are asking the court to re-examine
the State Engineer's decision in a similar situation. The
applicant was given an extension of time by order of the
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State Engineer to the 15th day of June, 1923 (R. 287).
Prior to the expiration of that time applicant applied for
a further extension, but the requested extension would
have extended the time beyond the end of the fourteenyear period (R. 287). The State Engineer granted until
July 31, 1923 ( R. 287).
Within the time prescribed by the State Engineer
(July 31, 1923) the applicant filed a proof of appropriation. This is admitted by Appellants (Brief p. 7). The
State Engineer considered the proof submitted to be adequate for the purpose of holding applicant's priority, but
returned it for additions and corrections (Def. Ex. 3).
The corrections were made within the additional time
allowed by the State Engineer, the proof was accepted,
and the certificate issued (Ex. D). For the next 28 years
nobody challenged it, and water was used with all of the
parties recognizing the validity of the certificate and its
priority (R. 60, 115, 117, 174, 175, 108, 243).
This is not a case where there was a total failure to
comply with the statute. Appellants simply ask the court
in a collateral proceeding to examine the things which
happened in the State Engineer's office and to determine
that the State Engineer was in error in accepting the
proof, because of deficiences.
e will argue in the next
subdivision that the alleged deficiencies are not such that
the State Engineer should in any event haYe been reversed, but we state here that this court ought not under
the showing made by Appellants in this case, re-examine
the decision reached by the State Engineer in 1923, in

'V
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which decision the State Engineer concluded that the
proof submitted on time sufficiently complied with the
statute, and permitted it to be filed. The holding of the
trial court in this regard corresponds with the law as set
forth by the Supreme Court in the Charlton case, supra,
and its decision ought not to be disturbed. If we are
sustained on this point, then sub-section (b) which follows becomes immaterial.
(b) THE DEFICIENCIES IN THE PROOF
WERE NOT SUCH AS TO CAUSE A LOSS
OF PRIORITY, EVEN WERE THE
COURT TO GO BEHIND THE CERTIFICATE AND RE-EXAMINE THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE STATE ENGINEER.
It is admitted by appellants that applicant was
granted an extension of time until July 31, 1923, within
which to submit proof of appropriation (R. 287). (Brief
p. 7) It likewise is admitted by Appellants that within
the time required, Respondents' predecessor, Gerber,
did file a proof of appropriation on a blank furnished by
the State Engineer (Brief, p. 7). This proof was introduced in evidence as part of the file on Certificate No.
1477, as Exhibit 3 (R. 153). The proof was received by
the State Engineer on the 30th day of July, 1923 (asappellants admit at page 7 of their brief), which was prior
to the expiration of the time for submitting proof.
~~r
nin~

1,

in

In challenging the adequacy of the proof, Appellants
note on page 7 of their brief that the proof was filed apparently without being sworn to on July 30, 1923. The rec9
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ord stands uncontradicted to the effect that the practice
of the State Engineer was in 1923, and now is, to have
the proof of appropriation submitted unsigned, the purpose apparently being to have the affidavits by the
engineers, witnesses and appropriators await the final
corrections. Engineer Colton testified that this was and
is the practice (R. 275). There is a letter dated March 5,
1924, which was a part of Exhibit 3, in which the State
Engineer directed applicants to sign the affidavits and
certificates after "the corrections required have been
made.'' Thus, the failure of the applicants to sign and
swear to the proof at the time it was originally filed is in
accordance with the practice which has prevailed in the
Office of the State Engineer for thirty years and was in
accordance with the State Engineer's instructions.
Appellants next note that the $1.00 filing fee was paid
in time, and on July 25, 1923; but they say that the proof
vvas fatally defective, because the $5.00 fee for examining and approving the proof was not filed before July 31st
-the date on which proof of appropriation was due.
Appellants do not cite any authority for their contention
that the $5 examination fee had to be paid when the proof
is filed, nor do they even note the statutes relating to fees.
Apparently the statute then in effect was Title 31, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917. Section 2516 specified the fees
of the State Engineer, and proYided "The State Engineer
shall collect the following fees * * * For examining map,
profile nnd drawings that are part of the proof of appropriation, $5.00.''
10
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It will be noted that Section 2516 does not provide
that this $5.00 fee must be paid at the time the proof of
appropriation is filed, nor does the statute even state
that the fees must be paid in advance of the rendering of
the service. It should be noted that the opening section
(2510) of that chapter specifiically requires the fees of
certain state officers "to be collected in advance," but
enumerated officers do not include the State Engineer.
Thus, there is no statutory authority to support the argument made by appellants. The filing fee was paid in
advance, to-wit, on July 25th. This was six days prior to
the date proof was due. The fee for examining the proof
maps was also paid before the proof maps were examined,
because, as is admitted by Appellants, this $5.00 fee was
paid October 20th when the proof maps were filed.

There is considerable authority to the effect that
even had there been a failure to pay the filing fee, it would
not have voided the application, nor lost the priority.
Mining laws generally require that the notice of location
be recorded with the County Recorder. There have been
cases in which the locator tendered the notice of location
for recordation, the recorder accepted the same without
requesting the fee. Thereafter a conflicting claimant
asserted that the failure to pay the fee rendered the prior
claim void. The courts under such situations have ruled
that the failure of the Recorder to collect the Recording
fee would not render the mining claim void. See Shepard
v. Murphy, 26 Colo. 350, 58 P. 588, where the court said:
''The matter of the time of payment of fees was
exclusively one between that official and the plain-
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tiff, and the officer, if he saw fit, might waive that
requirement.''
We thus here have a situation where the filing fee
was paid on time and the statute on the fee for examining
the proof does not specify the time when the same should
be paid. For all that appears from the statute, it was
paid on time. Appellants' contention that both fees had
to be paid at the time the proof was submitted is not supported by any statutory language, or any other authority.
It is simply an unsupported conclusion drawn by the
Appellants. They admit on page 7 that both fees were
paid, and we deny that either fee was paid late. But in
any event, the State Engineer accepted the proof and
under the authority of Shepard v. Murphy, supra, even
a total failure to pay the fee would not lose to Respondents their priority.
We respectfully submit that there is no merit to Appellants' position in regard to the payment of fees.
The next ground upon which the certificate of appropriation is challenged is that complete maps, plans and
profiles were not filed with the proof. The present statute
73-3-16, DCA 1953, expressly gives the State Engineer
the power to waive proof maps and drawings. It is admitted that the proof itself was filed July 30, 1923; that
time for submitting proof did not expire until the following day (Appellants' brief page 7). The record indicates
that complete proof maps were not submitted at that time.
The entire file relating to Certificate 1477 was tendered
as defendants' Exhibit 3, but since it was the State En12
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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gineer's file, the State Engineer was permitted to withdraw it, and the parties were given permission to photostat any particular document. The attorneys for the parties read substantial portions of the file into the record
and stipulated regarding the same so that very little of
the file was in fact photostated. We note this, because
much of the detail on this particular file is only given by
way of conclusion by counsel in their stating of the matter into the record. The trial court finally concluded that
the whole file should be rejected, because this was a collateral attack on the certificate, so the file, while proffered
in evidence and received pro forma was finally excluded
by the court's judgment and withdrawn by the State
Engineer.
Part of the lands covered by Certificate No. 1477
were included in the proof maps previously filed by the
White Rocks Irrigation Company under its Certificate
No. 644 (R. 282). Mr. Colton testified that it is customary to adopt these maps by reference and not to resubmit
the same maps (R. 282). We, therefore, on July 30th, one
day before time for submitting proof had expired, had
paid the $1.00 filing fee for filing proofs. (Appellants'
brief 7); had filed a proof of appropriation on the blank
furnished b ythe State Engineer and in the form required
by the State Engineer's rules and regulations; and finally
reference had been made in the proof to the proof maps
already on file under the White Rocks application
(R. 282). The State Engineer accepted the proof and
thereafter requested the additional proof maps and water
measurements.

13
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The State Engineer concluded that the proof :filed
July 30th was adequate to avoid a forfeiture of the water
right, and that the compliance with each of his other
1·equests was also timely and adequate, and he, therefore,
issued his certificate of appropriation (Ex. D). We believe that there was a substantial compliance with the
statute, and that this court should not hold that the State
Engineer erred in so ruling.
Perhaps one other thing should be noted in this regard. Everybody admits that Gerber was the first
appropriator among these parties. He filed his application in 1908 (Ex. D). His son was on the land in 1914
(R. :31). By 1922 his works were completed and various
witnesses indicated that he was growing crops of corn
and hay (R. 37, 132). Thus, Gerber had a well-established
farm before any of these other parties entered upon the
scene. They knew his ranch was there, and that they
were attempting to establish a secondary right. Appellant Justice did not file his application until June 16, 1922
(Ex. F). Benjamin Cook filed his application :Jiarch 19,
1924 (Ex. E). The Eli Smith application was filed February 14, 1927 (Ex. C). The Justice application was
lapsed, as will be noted below. Thus, all of these parties
came on to the stream and started their homesteads
aftL•r the Gerber Ranch was well established, and they are
here attempting to prevail upon this court to declare a
forfeiture which will permit them to "leap frog" over the
priority of the Hubers. The law abhores a forfeiture,
nnd there is little equity in the position they here press.
Had the State Engineer on July 30, 1923, rejected Ger-

14
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her's proof as being inadequate and not in compliance
with the statute, Gerber being thus warned, could have
applied for reinstatement and could still have had a priority date immediately after July 30, 1923. The law has
never required and did not then require the applicant to
start over. It merely caused the postponement of the priority date from the date of the original application to the
date when the proof was made. The statute is quoted on
pages 8 and 9 of Appellants' brief, and is Section 55,
Chapter 67, Laws of Utah, 1919. By October 20, 1923,
when the proof maps came in and the $5.00 examining
fee was paid, the proof met all requirements of the statute, even though minor corrections were made thereafter,
and an October 20, 1923, priority date would be ahead of
all these Appellants.
The file on the Ollie Justice right was introduced in
evidence and then withdrawn by the State Engineer.
However, his application 9059 was introduced and still
remains in the file as Exhibit F. It shows on its face that
it was lapsed and then reinstated with its original priority date. The parties stipulated extensively concerning
the history of this application, beginning at page 255 of
the record. The entire file on the Ollie Justice right is
designated Exhibit L, and it was received in evidence
(R. 55). An application for an extension of time for submitting proof is stamped as having been received October
17, 1931, and there is endorsed on the back thereof ''Time
within which proof of appropriation is due is hereby extended to November 10, 1932. '' That extension was dated
October 19, 1931, and was endorsed by George Bacon,

15
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State Engineer (R. 55). The file then shows an instrument bearing date of September 12, 1932. It is addressed
to Mr. Ollie W. Justice, in care of Leon P. Christensen,
Vernal, Utah, and it notifies the addressee that proof
would be due November 10, 1932. There is then a request
for an extension of time which is stamped as having been
received by the State Engineer November 14, 1932. The
request is signed by Ollie W. Justice and notarized by
Leon P. Christensen (R. 56). There is also a letter of
transmittal signed by Leon P. Christensen, dated
November 7, 1932, and it is stamped as having been
received November 14, 1932 (R. 56). Thus, the request for an extension of time was received four
days late. The State Engineer lapsed the application, and there is considerable correspondence between
the State Engineer, Mr. 0. W. Justice and Attorney Hugh
Colton, who states in his letters that he represented Mr.
Justice as to the propriety of the State Engineer lapsing
the application (R. 56). Letters were exchanged until
January 16, 1933, but it was stipulated that the file does
not reflect that any appeal was taken (R. 57). The file
fails to show that anything else transpired until May 28,
1940, and Appellants so stipulated (R. 57). A different

State Engineer accepted an affidavit from Mr. Justice on
May 28, 1940. The State Engineer, on August 14, 1940,
then stated:
''After giving careful study to this situation, I
am convinced that in 1932 the State Engineer did
not comply with the law in sending notice of proof
due to Mr. Christensen and not to the applicant.
16
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Since the law was not complied with as to notice,
it is my opinion that the lapsing of the application
because proof was not made, nor a request for an
extension submitted within the time allowed, was
contrary to law. I have, therefore, this date reinstated your application as of the original priority,
and extended to and including October 25, 1941,
the time in which appropriation may be submitted." (R. 57-58)

Hud

The file does not reflect that in granting the extension
to October 25, 1941, any notice was published of a proposal on the part of the State Engineer to extend the time
for submitting proof beyond the fourteen-year period
(R. 58). It is this particular thing that Appellants are
complaining about on the Gerbers, to-wit, that the State
Engineer permitted proof maps and amendments of the
proof on October 20th, which was some fifty days after
the expiration of the fourteen-year period fixed by statute. The statute provided then, and still does, that the
State Engineer could grant extensions of time up to 14
. years ( simply on affidavit, but after fourteen years only
after publication of notice (Section 73-3-12 UCA 1953).
We thus have a situation where one State Engineer
reached the conclusion that proof had not been submitted
when due on November 10, 1932; that the application requesting an extension of time filed November 14, 1932,
was four days late, and that the application should be
lapsed. The correspondence in the file adequately reflects
that Justice had notice of the State Engineer's decision.
The statute says this decision shall be final unless
appealed (Sec. 73-3-12). He did not within the sixty days
17
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required by Section 73-3-14, DCA 1953, file his appeal
with the District Court, nor did he do anything else except
argue for a few months with the State Engineer. He let
eight years go by. He also let the fourteen-year period
expire. He then induced a new State Engineer to reverse
the decision of his predecessor and reinstate the application with a 1922 priority. He is not aided here, as we are,
by the issuance of a certificate, because even as of this
date Justice has not obtained a certificate of appropriation. He apparently wants the court to hold that the State
Engineer for him could exceed the fourteen-year period;
that he could ignore the statute, making decisions of the
State Engineer binding upon him, unless within sixty
days after notice he appeals, and he wants the court to
uphold the quasi-judicial decision of the State Engineer
in 1940, reversing the previous engineer's decision, and
reinstating his application in 1922. On the other hand,
where the Gerber's filing is concerned, Justice wants the
technical letter of the law obeyed, wants the State Engineer to be treated as a file clerk, with no discretion or
judgment in determining the adequacies of a proof of
appropriation, wants the court to look behind a certificate
of appropriation to irregularities not nearly so glaring
or serious as are his own and to bring down the priority
of the Gerber right.
All of the parties admit, and, of course, they must
do so, that the filing fees, approval fees, proof maps and
proof forms were on file by October :2~1, 1923 (App. brief
p. 7). Even if the court were to hold that Gerber lost
his priority by reason of the technical deficiences in his
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proof which was filed on. time, his priority would only be
brought down to October 20, 1923. This is ahead of all
of the certificates of all of the defendants, except Justice, as shown by their certificates and applications (Ex.
C, D & F), and is also ahead of 1Ir. Justice, whose priority certainly would have to be brought down by reason of
the above history, if the same legal theory is applied. In
this regard, the court should bear in mind that we are not
collaterally attacking a certificate in the case of Mr. Justice. He has no certificate. He failed to appeal the State
Engineer's decision, lapsing his application, and sat idle
for eight years when a new State Engineer, without statutory authority and without following the statutory proceedings reinstated his application and granted him a
proof date beyond the fourteen-year period. Thus, under
any view of the case the right of the Respondents is ahead
of the rights of the Appellants, and the decree was properly entered.
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2. THE EVIDENCE ADEQUATELY SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS
THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT LOST
THEIR WATER BY ADVERSE USE.
Appellants assert that the evidence shows that
Hubers abandoned their water and lost it by adverse possession to appellants. They also assert that a contract
was made, whereby Respondents yielded their rights.
The trial court found in favor of the Respondents, and
Appellants have the burden of showing that there is no
evidence to sustain the findings. We submit that the trial
court is adequately supported by the evidence. Every
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witness who testified admitted that the Huber right has
had its water and has been treated as the prior right on
the stream. For the convenience of the court, we detail
some of that evidence :
ELI SMITH -

Witness for Appellant:

Mr. Smith testified (R. 115) that a meeting was held
by all the users and that "it seems to me that we did
decide that as long as the water would reach Hubers, why,
we'd let it alone. After it got down to about a second-foot,
then we'd take the water above.'' On cross-examination
he was asked a question, "and you always recognized that
they (Hubers) had a right superior to yours in the
stream? A. I did. Q. And whenever the Hubers would
insist upon the water coming down, they didn't have to
take your dam out, because you would? A. That is right.
Q. And you did release it to them whenever they would
request you to do it? A. I did. Q. And over these years
there were occasions when they would request you to remove the dam and let the water down? A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when they made those requests you took your
dams out and turned the water down to them? A. I did.''
He also again stated on cross-examination (R. 117)
that as long as the water would reach the Hubers the
parties agreed at a meeting that Smith (the witness), Justice and Cook would leave the water alone.
Appellant CooK :

Appellant Cook testified on direct examination (R.
1656) that his father shut the water off dry and took it
20
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all when a man named Parry, who has a diligence right
prior to any of these parties, took the water at a point
upstream. However, on cross-examination (R. 173), he
testified that they didn't exactly watch to determine when
Parry dammed off the water, "but when the water got
low enough in the ditch to not reach Hubers we took it.''
"Q. But as long as the water would reach Hubers, you
didn't dam it off dry~ A. No." The witness said he
did not claim a better priority than Hubers (R. 173}, and
that he knew priorities were controlled by filings with the
State Engineer. At page 174 of the Record he again
admitted that he recognized the Huber right as the earliest filing "but not for six second-feet." He was then
asked, '' Q. And you recognized it to the extent of never
trying to shut the stream off dry until after the time did
arrive during the season when the stream would not
reach the Hubers~ A. Yes."
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Mr. Cook was then asked (R. 187): "Q. Now the situation that exists here, is that you people have always
recognized that when the flow of water was reaching the
Hubers in a quantity big enough to do them any good,
that they had the prior right to take it~ A. We tried to
recognize that until the other waters from the other
sources came in-until the water from Mosby Mountain
came in. Q. Then there was a time when you people decided that the streams wouldn't get down Deep Creek in
a large enough quantity to do the Hubers any good, so
you put your tight dam in. That is correct isn't it~
A. Yes.''
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By way of explanation it should be noted that water
of Mosby Irrigation Company was placed in Deep Creek
and commingled with the Deep Creek water. This was
done only in recent years, and Mr. Cook's statement that
they recognized the Huber right as being prior "until
the other water came in,'' had reference to this Mosby
water, as his answers indicate.
We thus have express admissions from Eli Smith,
who was the owner of one of the water rights, and Mr.
Cook, who is the owner of another of those rights, that
both recognized that Hubers had the best priority, and
that the upstream users would not take the water until
the stream dropped to a point where the flow was not
large enough to do the Hubers any good.
Appellant JusTICE:

Appellant Justice admits that he moved onto his
land in 1923, and first raised a crop (R. 196). He admitted
on cross-examination (R. 213) that he told the Hubers
that "they might haYe a priority to the water, but it
wasn't theirs to do as they pleased with.'' He admits
on page 219 that he remembers a ~Ir. Burton from the
Stn te Engineer's office coming to his land to make a
field examination, and on cross-examination at R. 237,
he admits that he may haYe told I\Ir. Burton that the
users had had a meeting in the early 1930's in which the
understanding ·was reached "that if there were water
enough to reach the Huber ranch, none would be diYerted
by the upper users until the flow at this ranch had reached
22
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6 second-feet. When the water recedes, so that delivery
can not be made to Huber, each owner of the upper rights
may take all that reaches his point of diversion, provided
he does not exceed his right." Mr. Justice said that this
agreement had been honored by all until recent years,
when Cook began to use water any time that it is at his
point of diversion."
He was asked again at R. 242 whether or not he
didn't think the Hubers had a better priority. He said
he didn't because, "no man could obtain a water right
without the beneficial use thereof." At page 243 of the
Record he said: ''I insisted that they didn't have the
right to run a lot of water down that channel when they
couldn't get no beneficial use out of it. Q. When the
amount of water wasn't enough to do them any good~ A.
Yes sir. Q. When that would occur, the stream was so low
that they couldn't get any use out of it, then you considered you had a right to take the water at your dam~ A.
That was my theory.''
He admits at R. 244 that he always had trouble with
the Hubers; that the Hubers came up every year for
their water. Specifically, he said, "No, I wouldn't deny
that they haven't been up there every year." At page
245 he admits that the Hubers took out his dams.

Witness

BuRTON :

The parties stipulated that if Witness Burton from
the Office of the State Engineer were called as a witness
he would testify in accordance with a report which he
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filed, and which is set out in full at R. 258 and 259. In
this statement he indicated that Mr. Justice told him of
an agreement. His language is as follows :
"The first appropriation from Deep Creek was
Application No. 1713 by Moroni Gerber, later
transferred to a Mr. Huber. Under this right the
water is used approximately 1 mile east and 1 mile
south of LaPoint. During low water or seasons
of small run-off, the water will not reach the
Huber areas. l\1any years ago a dispute arose between the Huber right and the rights upstream,
and a meeting was held at which a verbal agreement was reached. This understanding provided
that if there were water enough to reach the Huber
ranch, none would be diverted by the upper users
until the flow at this ranch had reached 6 secondfeet. When the water recedes so that delivery cannot be made to Huber, each owner of the upper
rights may take all that reaches this point of diversion, provided he does not exceed his right. Mr.
Justice said that this agreement had been honored
by all until recent years when Cook began to use
water any time that it is at his points of diversion.''
It was in reference to this statement that l\Ir. Justice
was asked whether or not he may haYe given ~Ir. Burton
the information recited by l\1r. Burton, and :\Ir. Justice
admitted that he may haYe done so (R. 237).
We thus, respectfully submit that all of the Appellants have themselves admitted that they haYe treated
the Huber right as the prior right; that they had an
agreement that they would not take any of the water in
the spring before high water, if (a) the water was reach24
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ing the Huber Ranch, and (b) the amount at the Huber
Ranch was less than 6 c.f.s. During high water they
would take water according to their rights, but when the
stream receded so that there was not six c.f.s. at the
Huber Ranch, all of the upstream users who are parties
to this suit would leave the water alone until the stream
receded to a point where it would not reach the Hubers
in quantities sufficient to do them any good. The upstream
users would then take it. This is exactly what the trial
court found to be the fact. See Finding No.9 (R 54). In
addition to the testimony of the Appellants in this regard,
the testimony from the Hubers adequately supports the
trial court's findings (R. 61-66).
3. RESPONDENTS ADEQUATELY SHOWED
THEIR RIGHT TO USE WATER UNDER
CERTIFICATE NO. 1477.
Appellants' last objection is raised for the first time
on appeal, as they admit on page 24 of their brief. The
certificate of appropriation which gives the complete detail of Respondents' right, is in evidence as Exhibit D. It
is by statute prima facie evidence of the water right.
73-3-17, UCA 1953. The water covered by the certificate
is a primary right (the exclusive water used) on part of
the land, and is a secondary or supplemental right to the
balance. The certificate describes by metes and bounds
the lands on which the right is supplementary and the
lands as to which the right is primary. Engineer Jones
prepared an exhibit on a land use map of the Soil Conservation District, showing the lands below the White
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Rocks Ditch and the lands irrigated exclusively from
Deep Creek (Ex. G). The irrigated acreage is there set
forth. Neither of the exhibits is contraverted by any testimony of Appellants. The court expressly specified in
its decree that the water right of Respondents is represented by Certi:fi.icate No.1477, which does show all of this
as is indicated above.
This area is extremely short of water, and without
irrigation the Huber lands were barren and unproductive.
Mr. Taylor testified that Gerbers always used all of the
water they could get and didn't waste any (R. 256). Appellant Cook admits on cross-examination (R. 182) that
he has never seen the Hubers permit water to run beyond
their place, except during the the flood season; that
Hubers have lived on their ranch at all times since 1929;
that they have made their living exclusively from their
farm; that their land is not productiYe without water;
that it is beneficial for them to divert the water from
Deep Creek on to the ground, and that he does not know
of a time when Hubers have let water run to waste, other
than in extremely high water periods ; that they have
raised crops on their lands every year (R. 182-4). Appellants, of course, raise no question in the evidence that
IIubers had too much water for their lands and will never
try to make such an assertion because it isn't true. l\Ir.
Justice said (R. 250) that the people in this area haYe
to use their wnter carefully, in order to make a living.
Mr. Colton testified that the crops frequently failed for
lack of water (R. 143).
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We submit that the certificate affirmed by the decree
amply shows the lands for which the water is primary
and the lands for which it is secondary, and that the record discloses that the water has been and is beneficially
being used to the full extent of the decreed right. Appellants should not be heard to contend for the first time on
appeal and without having raised the issue at all in the
trial court, that there was not a finding of beneficial use.
The certificate itself made a prima facie case (See Sec.
73-3-17, 1953), and to the extent the matter was referred
to by the witnesses it is clear that the water has always
been used and is necessary to the raising of crops.
We respectfully submit that the judgment of the
lower court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

13!11:

from

EDWARD W. CLYDE
Attorney for Plaintiffs and
Respondents
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